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Abstract
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the
United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust
Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation
is ine¢ cient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages
lead to a signi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may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.
Key words: hostile takeover; litigation contest; merger
JEL classication: D43; K21; L40
* We would like to thank Tomaso Duso, Paul Heidhues and Daniel Zimmer
for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG), grants KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 (Governance and the E¢ ciency of
Economic Systems), is gratefully acknowledged.
** Oliver Gürtler (corresponding author), Department of Economics, BWL II, Uni-
versity of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, e-mail: oliver.guert-
ler@uni-bonn.de, phone: +49-228-739214, fax: +49-228-739210.
*** Matthias Kräkel, Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn,
Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de,
phone: +49-228-739211, fax: +49-228-739210.
1
1 Introduction
From societys point of view, a merger should be prohibited if it were accom-
panied by a welfare loss. However, in the Western World there exist di¤erent
forms of antitrust enforcement.1 In the United States (U.S.), an adversarial
system is used in which the Antitrust Authority (AA) must explicitly sue
the acquiring rm and prove to a district court judge that merging will harm
society. Then merging will not happen if and only if the agency wins the
litigation contest against the acquiring rm. In the European Union (E.U.),
we have a kind of administrative or inquisitorial system. Here, the AA can
simply forbid merging without going to court.
This paper focuses on the U.S. or adversarial system and points out that
this kind of antitrust enforcement may be problematic because of its costly
litigation procedure. In particular, we will show that there are situations in
which the AA sues the acquiring rm although this litigation is ine¢ cient
from societys perspective because overall resource expenditures in the litiga-
tion contest exceed the expected welfare loss following the potential merger
(ine¢ ciency condition). We can show that even if merging harms society by
both market control and technological disadvantages (i.e. ex-post marginal
costs of the buyer are higher than ex-ante ones) the agency should not always
become active under the adversarial system. Furthermore, in the case of a
hostile takeover the problem of ine¢ cient litigation may be aggravated if the
top management of the target rm assists the agency in the litigation contest
by spending time and resources of its rm.
Note that, in fact, we have two ine¢ ciency problems which represent two
sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the AA can always become active if
1Baker (2005) gives a clear comparison of both forms of antitrust enforcement. For a
general economic comparison of both court methods see Tullock (1975).
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post-merger welfare would be smaller than pre-merger welfare (scenario 1).
If in this case the agency does not care for future litigation costs, suing the
acquiring rm may be ine¢ cient (i.e. the ine¢ ciency condition may hold).
On the other hand, the agency may anticipate future litigation costs and will
remain inactive if these costs are too high (scenario 2). In other words, the
agency will not sue the acquiring rm if the ine¢ ciency condition is satised.
However, in this scenario there are exactly the same problematic cases as in
the scenario before all those cases that fulll the ine¢ ciency condition. In
these cases, now the AA allows merging (with probability one), since it has
to stick to the adversarial procedure, although society clearly su¤ers from
merging because ex-post welfare is smaller than ex-ante welfare. As both
scenarios lead to the same problematic cases, we only have to consider one
scenario. We will consider the rst one.
There is anecdotal evidence that the problem we are discussing in this
paper is indeed a highly relevant one.2 This evidence comes from the law-
suit of the Department of Justice (DOJ) against Oracle which wanted to
take over PeopleSoft. Since merging was against the will of PeopleSofts top
management we have a strictly hostile takeover. Both Oracle and PeopleSoft
were important corporations operating in the market for computer software.
2Besides this case, Baker (2005, p. 5) states: "The powerful incentives for developing
and testing evidence created by the adversarial approach of the United States may at
times lead to wasted resources. The extensive evidentiary production in the typical second
request, supplied by the merging parties at great expense and substantial loss of executive
time, is largely cha¤ and not wheat. Certainly, in retrospect, much appears wasted.....In
addition, much of the massive e¤ort involved in trial preparation on both sides of the
case has little social value, notwithstanding its litigation benet to the parties." Similarly,
Baumol and Ordover (1985, p. 248), summarize: "One knows that the costs in terms
of the time of management, lawyers, economists, and others absorbed in the litigation
process itself are enormous."
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As the DOJ argued, a takeover would lead to a decline of innovation and
would also harm society because of signicant market concentration. The
Oracle-DOJ trial started just after announcement of the takeover in June
2003 and lasted until September 2004 when a federal judge allowed Oracle
to pursue its takeover bid. However, the whole takeover was completed four
months later in January 2005 since PeopleSofts top managers had decided
to apply typical defense measures such as poison pills which resulted in ad-
ditional lawsuits. The Oracle-DOJ case is interesting for di¤erent reasons.
First, the lawsuit was very time consuming and long lasting. Second, both
parties signicantly spent resources in the trial. Oracle paid millions of dol-
lars on lawyers fees. According to Oracles fourth-quarter earnings call 2004,
it has spent 54.2 million up to that date.3 The costs of the DOJ can only
be estimated but should be comparable to that of Oracle. Third, since the
takeover was hostile, PeopleSofts top managers massively assisted the DOJ
during the trial and spent lots of resources in the takeover battle and the
lawsuit. According to PeopleSofts lings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) these resources came up to 70 million dollars.4 Finally,
since PeopleSofts top managers also fought against Oracles takeover bid
independently of the Oracle-DOJ trial by using typical defense activities we
have two battles that are partly sequential. All these characteristics can be
found in our modelling in the next sections.
As often pointed out in the merger literature (e.g., Baumol and Ordover
1985), society faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, mergers may
be welfare enhancing by generating cost advantages or, more generally, syn-
3See Boucher Ferguson (2004).
4See again Boucher Ferguson (2004). As Pallatto (2004) took it: "The stakes are so
high in Oracles interminable campaign to buy out PeopleSoft that both companies could
end up bleeding themselves to exhaustion in this war of attrition."
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ergies which are in line with e¢ ciency considerations. On the other hand,
mergers may also be anticompetitive and, hence, welfare reducing. There
are several papers on antitrust enforcement which are based on this dilemma
when deriving the optimal standard for challenging or approving a merger.
Besanko and Spulber (1993) assume that merging rms are better informed
about potential cost savings from the merger. The AA optimally reacts
to this information asymmetry by setting a standard that is stronger than
the social welfare criterion. Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) also address the
asymmetric-information problem. They consider a game between society
and two merging rms which have private information about e¢ ciency of
the merger which can be used to inuence the decision of the AA. While
the merging rmsinformation is helpful for the antitrust decision, process-
ing and gathering information is assumed to be costly. Within this setting,
Lagerlöf and Heidhues derive societys optimal antitrust decision rule. In the
model by Motta and Vasconcelos (2005), each merger has to be approved
by the AA before being executed where the agency is either myopic or for-
ward looking (i.e. it anticipates subsequent merging). The agencys type
clearly determines its antitrust decision. There are no e¢ ciency problems
concerning a forward looking agency. Finally, Neven and Röller (2005) raise
the question whether the AA should apply a consumer surplus standard or
a welfare standard when challenging a merger. In their setting, third parties
can choose rent-seeking activities in order to inuence the AA which is only
imperfectly monitored.
Our model departs from these papers by two means. First, we do not
address the question of societys optimal antitrust decision rule but focus on
the process of the adversarial system which is based on an explicit litigation
contest. Second, and related to the rst point, we do not face the funda-
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mental dilemma of merging since we assume that the given merger is purely
anticompetitive and, therefore, always welfare reducing and may even lead
to cost disadvantages.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will introduce
a basic model on the litigation contest between the AA and the acquiring
rm. In Section 3, we derive a condition for the contest to be e¢ cient and
show that this condition is always satised in the linear Cournot model, but
always violated under Bertrand competition. Section 4 then focuses on the
case of a hostile takeover and introduces the top management of the target
rm as third party participating in the contest. In Section 5, we discuss the
case in which the purchase price of the acquiring rm is not adjusted to the
target managements resource expenditures spent in the litigation contest.
Moreover, we analyze the situation of a hostile takeover with two sequential
contests in which rst litigation between the AA and the acquiring rm
happens. Thereafter, if the agency fails, a takeover battle between the raider
and the target management will take place. Section 6 will conclude.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a duopoly where rm B (buyer) wants to obtain market control
by acquiring rm T (target rm).5 The pre-merger duopoly prots are B
for rm B and T for rm T . We assume that B has to pay the amount T
to player T in case of a merger. Then rm T is shut down; hence the only
motive for a merger is decreasing competition.6 The post-merger market
5The model can easily be extended to the case of an oligopoly with N  2 rms.
6This modelling of mergers is also utilized by Salant et al. (1983), Kamien and Zang
(1990), Fauli-Oller and Motta (1996), Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), Ziss
(2001). In the case of constant marginal costs, for example, the buyer is indi¤erent between
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prot of B is described by ^B with ^B > B and B := ^B   B. Let
consumerssurplus be CSD under duopoly and CSM under monopoly after
the successful merger. Hence, welfare can be dened as
WD = CSD + B + T (1)
under duopoly, and
WM = CSM + ^B (2)
in the monopoly case. Let W := WD  WM .
It is assumed that the AA A has to prohibit the merger according to
the Merger Guidelines because of W > 0. In order to be successful, A
has to go to court and win the respective litigation contest against B. In
the contest, A spends a certain amount of resources xA  0 to inuence
its winning probability p (xA; xB) 2 [0; 1] where xB denotes the resources
invested by rm B. Naturally, the winning probability of rm B is given by
1   p (xA; xB). p (; ) is a di¤erentiable function, on which we impose the
following assumption:7
Assumption 1: (i) p (; ) is symmetric, i.e. p (xA; xB) = 1   p (xB; xA), (ii)
p1 > 0, p11 < 0, p2 < 0, p22 > 0, (iii) p12 > 0, p > 0:5.
Part (i) is a standard assumption as well as part (ii), which implies that
spending resources has positive but diminishing marginal e¤ects on the own
probability of winning the contest. Moreover, part (iii) is very intuitive, too.
If, initially, the agency A chooses higher expenditures, a marginal increase in
xB makes it more attractive for A to increase xA as well. This is due to the
more intense competition the increase in rm Bs expenditures has caused.
shutting down the acquired rms or not.
7Here, as well as in all what follows, a subscript accompanying the function p (; )
denotes a partial derivative.
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Similarly, if, initially, xA < xB, an increase in xB makes the contest more
uneven so that it is benecial for the agency to invest less. Note that part (iii)
together with Youngs theorem implies that p21 > 0 , p > 0:5, which can
be interpreted analogously. Notice further that part (iii) is fullled for the
two most frequently used specications of p(xA; xB), the logit-form contest-
success function8 and the probit-form contest-success function9.
Note that typically we will have an asymmetric contest with PA = W
denoting the winner prize ofA and PB = B T that of rmB. We assume
PB > 0 to focus on the interesting cases in which a merger is protable for
buyer B. In order to guarantee the existence of interior equilibria at the
litigation stage we additionally introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 2: The parameter constellations are such that PAp1(0; xB) > 1,
8xB  0, and  PBp2(xA; 0) > 1, 8xA  0, 8PA; PB > 0.
In the next section, we will investigate under which conditions the litiga-
tion contest initiated by the AA is e¢ cient. Section 4 then deals with the
case of a hostile takeover where the top management of the target rm may
assist A to win the contest against B.
3 Litigation Contest between Antitrust Au-
thority and Buyer
In the contest, the agency chooses xA in order to maximize
W  p (xA; xB)  xA;
8The logit-form contest was introduced by Tullock (1980) and is dealt with in more
detail in Section 3. For a formal proof that part (iii) of Assumption 1 is fullled in both
kinds of contest see Dixit (1987).
9See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981).
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whereas buyer B spends resources to maximize
(B   T )  (1  p (xA; xB))  xB:
Since both objective functions are strictly concave, equilibrium behavior
(xA; x

B) is characterized by the rst-order conditions
Wp1 (x

A; x

B) = 1 =   (B   T ) p2 (xA; xB) . (3)
From the perspective of the society, it will be e¢ cient to start the litiga-
tion contest if expected welfare minus overall resource expenditures exceeds
welfare under monopoly:
WD  p (xA; xB) +WM (1  p (xA; xB))  xA   xB > WM :
Hence, we obtain our rst result:
Proposition 1 The litigation contest will be e¢ cient if and only if
Wp (xA; x

B) > x

A + x

B: (4)
According to Proposition 1 suing rm B will only be desirable from so-
cietys perspective if the expected welfare gain from winning the litigation
is greater than the sum of expenditures by both parties. However, if the
agencys likelihood of winning or the welfare gain are rather small and/or
the two parties choose high investments in equilibrium, starting a law suit
against B will not pay o¤ for society. In the following, we will investigate
whether condition (4) may be violated under standard competition models
and typical contest-success functions p (xA; xB).
9
Consider the case of the well-known contest-success function10
p (xA; xB) =
8<:
xA
xA+xB
if xA + xB > 0
0:5 otherwise
(5)
which has been introduced by Tullock (1980).11 Here, the rst-order condi-
tions (3) yield
xA =
P
B
P 2A
(PB + PA)
2 and x

B =
P 2BPA
(PB + PA)
2 (6)
with PA = W and PB = B   T as dened in Section 2. Then simple
calculations show that, under the Tullock contest success function, condition
(4) can be written as
W > B   T : (4)
Note that by inserting forW in (4) we obtain CSD CSM > 2 (B   T ).
Hence, if the reduction of consumers surplus is su¢ ciently large and the
buyers prot increase B su¢ ciently small, litigation will be e¢ cient.
As examples, we will now take a look at two standard models of duopolis-
tic competition Cournot or quantity competition, and Bertrand or price
competition.
Example 1: Cournot Competition
Let the inverse demand function be linear: p (Q) = a   bQ (a; b > 0) with
Q = qB + qT and qi denoting quantity chosen by rm i (i = B; T ). Costs are
10Notice that in the special case, where only one party actively engages in rent-seeking,
one of the two assumptions p1 > 0 or p2 < 0 is not fullled. In this case, the party
engaging in rent-seeking wins the contest with probability 1 and so does not benet from
further increasing its rent-seeking e¤ort. However, as we focus on interior solutions, this
entails no problems for the analysis.
11See, e.g., Leininger (1993) and Gradstein and Konrad (1999) for an application to rent
seeking, and Wärneryd (2000) for an application to litigation contests. For an axiomati-
zation see Skaperdas (1996).
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assumed to be linear so that prots of rm i are described by i = pqi   cqi
with c 2 (0; a) (i = B; T ). Hence, in the pre-merger situation of a duopoly,
each rm optimally chooses q = (a  c) = (3b) and realizes prots  = B =
T = (a  c)2 = (9b). Consumerssurplus is given by
CSD =
QZ
0
p (Q) dQ  p Q
with Q = 2 (a  c) = (3b) and p = (a+ 2c) =3. Therefore, we obtain CSD =
2 (a  c)2 = (9b) so thatWD = 4 (a  c)2 = (9b). In case of a successful merger,
the monopolistB chooses qB = (a  c) = (2b) and gets prots ^B = (a  c)2 = (4b).
Consumerssurplus now amounts to
CSM =
qBZ
0
p (Q) dQ  p (qB)  qB =
(a  c)2
8b
and welfare to WM = CSM + ^B = 3 (a  c)2 = (8b). Altogether, we have
W = 5 (a  c)2 = (72b) and B   T = (a  c)2 = (36b). Therefore, under
homogeneous quantity competition with linear demand function and constant
marginal costs, the e¢ ciency condition (4) for litigation is always satised.
Example 2: Bertrand Competition
We consider the case of a linear demand function D (p) = 1   p where p
denotes product price, and constant marginal costs are again given by c > 0
for both rms B and T . As is well-known from the literature, in pre-merger
equilibrium the market price is p = c, both rms earn zero prots and split
market demand. Consumerssurplus is given by
CSD =
1Z
c
(1  p) dp = (1  c)
2
2
= WD:
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After a possible merger of B and T , the monopolist B maximizes ^B =
(p  c) (1  p) by choosing p = (1 + c) =2 which yields ^B (p) = (1  c)2 =4.
Consumerssurplus is
CSM =
1Z
p
(1  p) dp = (1  c)
2
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so that WM = 3 (1  c)2 =8: Since B   T = ^B (p) = (1  c)2 =4 >
WD  WM = (1  c)2 =8, e¢ ciency condition (4) is violated for all values of
c.
The following corollary summarizes our ndings:
Corollary 1 Let p (xA; xB) be described by the Tullock contest-success func-
tion (5), market demand be a linear function of price and rms be homoge-
neous with constant marginal costs. Under Cournot competition litigation is
always e¢ cient, but under Bertrand competition litigation is never e¢ cient.
The results of Corollary 1 point out that the form of market competition
is crucial for litigation being socially desirable or not. In particular, merging
in the Bertrand model is highly protable for rm B since B is very large.
In other words, the buyers welfare gains from switching to monopoly are
so high relative to reduced consumers surplus that litigation to prohibit
monopoly is ine¢ cient.
Interestingly, litigation may even be undesirable if merging results in
higher marginal costs ex-post. Consider again the case of the linear Bertrand
model (Example 2). Now, let post-merger marginal costs be c^ 2 (c; 1). Con-
dition (4) then becomes
(1  c)2
2
>
5 (1  c^)2
8
12
which is still violated as long as c^ <
p
5  2 (1  c) =p5 2 (c; 1). Hence,
even if merging is socially undesirable because of both reduced competition
and production ine¢ ciency, this situation may not justify litigation activities
of the AA.
To sum up, the results of this section have shown that the U.S. practice
of suing the buyer within an explicit litigation contest may lead to strict
ine¢ ciencies since the contest implies a waste of resources and the probability
of the agency being successful is strictly smaller than one. The last example
emphasizes that even if merging harms society by both market control and
technological ine¢ ciencies the AA should not always become active under
the U.S. system.
4 Hostile Takeover and Litigation
As we know from the case of Oracle versus PeopleSoft sketched in the in-
troduction, given a hostile takeover the top management of the target rm
may assist the AA during the litigation contest. Like the agency A, the top
management M of rm T can spend resources xM in the contest in order to
prevent the takeover. Since in this section we focus on hostile takeovers, top
management M will be dismissed if the raider B is successful and wins the
contest. In this case,M looses the benet BM > 0 (e.g., future salaries, repu-
tation, rm-specic knowledge). Resources xM belong to rm T and, hence,
to its shareholders. However, top managers often own shares of the rms
they manage. Moreover, top management M has to bear additional costs
when spending resources xM in the contest. For example, the managers have
to invest time in the law suit which then cannot be used for alternative
purposes (e.g., for increasing rm sales which would increase their remuner-
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ation). Therefore, we assume that investing xM in the litigation is not free
for M but leads to costs   xM with  2 (0; 1].12 Note that the value of
rm T decreases in xM . We assume that all parties are aware of these costs.
Accordingly, the price to be paid by the raider B for acquiring rm T is re-
duced to T   xM . This leaves the raiders benet from winning the contest
unchanged at B   T compared to Section 3.
To summarize, the contest game considered in this section has three play-
ers, M , A and B, with top management M maximizing
BM  p (xA + xM ; xB)    xM (7)
where the winning probability p (:; :) is dened as in Section 2. Similarly, the
Antitrust Authority A wants to maximize
W  p (xA + xM ; xB)  xA: (8)
Finally, the raider B now su¤ers from facing two opponents in the contest
and his objective function is given by
(B   T )  (1  p (xA + xM ; xB))  xB: (9)
We obtain the following results for the equilibrium (xMh; x

Ah; x

Bh):
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Proposition 2 (i) If W > BM

, then xMh = 0 and x

Ah; x

Bh > 0 being
described by (3). (ii) If W < BM

, then xAh = 0 and x

Mh; x

Bh > 0 with
BM

p1 (x

Mh; x

Bh) = 1 =   (B   T ) p2 (xMh; xBh) :
(iii) If W = BM

; then xMh; x

Ah  0 and xBh > 0 with
Wp1 (x

Ah + x

Mh; x

Bh) =
BM

p1 (x

Ah + x

Mh; x

Bh) =
  (B   T ) p2 (xAh + xMh; xBh) = 1:
12Otherwise, M would invest maximum resources in the given setting which is not
realistic.
13The subscript "h" indicates that here we consider the case of a hostile takeover.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The results of Proposition 2 point out that there is a fundamental free-
rider problem between players A and M . If the winner prize of the AA is
larger than that of the top management (in relation to marginal costs, i.e.
W > BM=), A has strong incentives and spends signicant resources while
M acts as a perfect free rider (xMh = 0). This result replicates the outcome
of the two-person contest in Section 3. However, if W < BM=, then we
have just the opposite result with player A free riding on Ms expenditures
by choosing xAh = 0. Finally, there is the special case in which A and M
have exactly the same relative winner prize. Then we have a continuum
of equilibria in which only the collective amount of resources xAh + x

Mh is
determinate.
In the preceding section, we have seen that, under the U.S. system, the AA
also becomes active and start a litigation contest in those situations where it
should remain passive from the societys point of view. What we will do next
is to analyze whether or not this ine¢ ciency will be aggravated, if a takeover
is hostile. For this purpose, we rst determine, how the expenditures in the
contest change compared to the situation in Section 3. First note that the
e¢ ciency problem is exactly the same as in Section 3 if W  BM

, i.e. in
cases (i) and (iii) described in Proposition 2 we have xAh + x

Mh  xA and
xBh  xB. In what follows, we therefore restrict attention to the case of
Proposition 2(ii) in which W < BM

. Before we proceed, notice further that
in both, the model in Section 3 as well as in the current model, equilibrium
outlays are characterized by two conditions of the form
Pyp1 (y
; z)  1 = 0 (10)
 Pzp2 (y; z)  1 = 0; (11)
in case they are (strictly) positive. Here, Py denotes the winner prize (in
15
relation to marginal outlays) of the agency and/or the top management and
y the respective optimal resource expenditure. Analogous denitions (i.e.
Pz and z) hold for the buyer. Bearing this in mind, we can derive the
following proposition, which compares the resource expenditures in the case
of Proposition 2(ii) with the optimal outlays from Section 3:
Proposition 3 Let W < BM

. (a) Then, for all parameter constellations,
we have xMh > x

A. (b) Further, if B   T  W , then xB > xBh. (c) If
B   T  BM , then xB < xBh. (d) Finally, if W < B   T < BM ,
either we have always xB < x

Bh or there exists a cut-o¤ value ~Z > B T
such that xB < x

Bh if and only if
BM

 ~Z.
Proof. See Appendix.
Obviously, if the top management values winning the contest relatively
higher than the AA, it will spend more resources, i.e. xMh > x

A. However,
the reaction of the buyer depends on whether replacement of the agency with
the top management makes the contest more or less intense. If B   T 
W < BM

(B T  BM > W ), the contest becomes less (more) intense
since the di¤erence of the playerswinner prizes increases (decreases), and
the buyer chooses a smaller (larger) amount of expenditures. Furthermore,
in the case, where W < B   T < BM , the switch from the AA to the
top management changes the role of the buyer. Initially, he was in a superior
position, which means that he was more likely to win the contest than the
agency. However, after the top management has replaced the AA as the party
actively engaging in litigation, the buyer loses his superior position and wins
the contest with probability less than 0:5. Depending on whether this switch
in roles makes the contest more or less intense, the buyer chooses a larger
or a smaller resource level. Hence, if BM

lies only slightly above B   T ,
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expenditures xBh will exceed x

B, otherwise, the relationship may well be the
other way round.
To sum up, it is possible that, under a hostile takeover aggregate liti-
gation expenditures are even higher than under a friendly takeover. This
would make the U.S. system even more ine¢ cient. Yet, in order to give clear
welfare implications, it is important to consider the changes in the winning
probabilities, too. Making it more likely to prevent an ine¢ cient takeover
may in principle outweigh the problem of higher litigation expenditures. This
is what we analyze next.
Proposition 4 Let (y; z) describe the solution to (10) and (11), and let
W < BM

. Further, suppose that Pz >  p21(y;z)p22(y;z)Py with Pz = PB and
Py 2
 
W; BM


. Then p (xMh; x

Bh) > p (x

A; x

B).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 states that, under a certain condition, replacement of the
agency with the top management makes it more likely that the ine¢ cient
takeover is prevented. The condition ensures that the buyer does not react
to strongly to changes in his opponents expenditures. Formally, jp21 (y; z)j
must not be too large. Then, the increase in the top managements outlays
(compared to the agency) increases the winning probability more than the
potential increase in the buyers expenditures decreases it. Hence, the man-
agement is more likely to win the contest than the agency initially was. Note
that the condition in Proposition 4 is always fullled for the contest-success
function (5), that is, under a Tullock contest the likelihood of prohibiting the
takeover will unambiguously increase if the agency is substituted by a more
aggressively acting target management.
Summarizing we see that the replacement of the AA with the top man-
agement in the contest can have countervailing welfare e¤ects. On the one
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hand, overall waste of resources in form of litigation expenditures may in-
crease; at least the outlays of the buyers opponent will rise. On the other
hand, the ine¢ cient takeover may less likely take place.
Whereas in general it is not possible to state which e¤ect dominates,
the case of a Tullock litigation contest as given by (5) yields a clear-cut
result. In case of a friendly takeover, we have already seen that litigation
outlays are given by (6), from which it follows that xA + x

B =
P
A
PB
PA+PB
and
p(xA; x

B) =
PA
PA+PB
. Similarly, if, in the case of a hostile takeover, the agency
is replaced by the top management we obtain xMh + x

Bh =
PMPB
PM+PB
and
p(xMh; x

Bh) =
PM
PM+PB
, with PM := BM . Therefore, expected welfare under a
friendly takeover is higher than expected welfare under a hostile one if and
only if
WM +
PA
PA + PB
W   PAPB
PA + PB
> WM +
PM
PM + PB
W   PMPB
PM + PB
(12)
Simplication of the condition leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Let W < BM

and the contest-success function given by (5).
Then, expected welfare under a hostile takeover is lower than expected welfare
under a friendly takeover, if and only if W < B   T .
Under the Tullock contest-success function, welfare implications crucially
depend on the relationship between the welfare spread, W , and the buyers
net prot increase due to merging, B   T . From the discussion follow-
ing Proposition 4 we know that, given (5), the probability of preventing the
merger is always larger under a hostile takeover with a strong top manage-
ment. However, if W < B   T the contest becomes more intense after
the replacement of A by the top management (see Proposition 3). Then, the
negative e¤ect due to higher resource expenditures dominates the positive ef-
fect of a higher success probability and welfare further decreases compared to
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the situation in Section 3. Recall that the litigation contest will be ine¢ cient
under a friendly takeover if W < B   T (see condition (4)). Interest-
ingly, according to Corollary 2, exactly in this situation things become even
worse, if the takeover is hostile. One the other hand, if W > B   T ,
the contest becomes less intense. Then, the e¤ect due to the higher winning
probability of the top management is dominant and welfare increases.
5 Discussion
In this section, two aspects will be discussed which have not been consid-
ered so far. First, we will investigate how the equilibrium outcome of the
litigation contest will change if the buyer does not bear in mind the target
managements resource expenditures, xM , when calculating a purchase price
for rm T . On the one hand, we can think of a myopic buyer who does not
anticipate that the future value of the target rm will decrease by the amount
xM which is going to be invested by a rationally acting management M in
the litigation contest. On the other hand, in practice it may be di¢ cult for
the buyer to convince the shareholders of the target rm T that it is worth
less than actual prot T . Hence, in this section we consider an alternative
scenario of the hostile-takeover case in which the buyer pays T instead of
T   xM when acquiring rm T . Now spending resources xM by the top
management has two e¤ects it enhances the agencys winning probability
in the litigation contest, and it decreases the value of rm T . The last e¤ect
will discourage buyer B as his prize of winning the contest is now given by
PB = B T  xM . All other assumptions of Section 4 remain unchanged.
Again, management M maximizes
BM  p (xA + xM ; xB)    xM
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and the Antitrust Authority A
W  p (xA + xM ; xB)  xA:
However, raider B now has a reduced winner prize so that his objective
function changes to
(B   T   xM)  (1  p (xA + xM ; xB))  xB:
The modied game has the following equilibria (x^Mh; x^

Ah; x^

Bh):
Proposition 5 (i) If W > BM

, then x^Mh = 0 and x^

Ah; x^

Bh > 0 being
described by (3). (ii) If W < BM

, then x^Ah = 0 and either x^

Mh < B T
and x^Mh; x^

Bh > 0 with
BM

p1 (x^

Mh; x^

Bh) = 1 =   (B   T   x^Mh) p2 (x^Mh; x^Bh) ;
or x^Mh  B T and x^Bh = 0 with BM p1 (x^Mh; 0) = 1. (iii) If W = BM ;
then either x^Mh < B   T and x^Mh; x^Ah  0, x^Bh > 0 with
Wp1 (x^

Ah + x^

Mh; x^

Bh) =
BM

p1 (x^

Ah + x^

Mh; x^

Bh) =
  (B   T   x^Mh) p2 (x^Ah + x^Mh; x^Bh) = 1;
or x^Mh  B T and x^Bh = 0 and x^Mh; x^Ah  0 withWp1 (x^Ah + x^Mh; 0) =
1.
Proof. See Appendix
When we compare Propositions 2 and 5 we can see one important dif-
ference. In Proposition 5, two things may happen if W  BM

. On the
one hand, player Ms optimal expenditures x^Mh can be rather moderate
so that both M and B remain active in the contest. On the other hand,
the management of the target rm may choose a preemptively high amount
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x^Mh  B   T which entirely discourages B who then drops out of the
contest. In this situation, the target management excessively invests in the
litigation. Such waste of rm Ts resources makes a takeover completely
unattractive for the raider. This outcome of the game will happen if the
managements loss from being dismissed, BM , is quite large but its costs
from using rm Ts resources in the contest (i.e. ) are rather small. How-
ever, such preemption never happens in Section 4 because of the buyers
adjusted purchase price.
Preemptive behavior in the litigation contest might aggravate the existing
ine¢ ciencies. In order to compare expected welfare under a friendly takeover
as discussed in Section 3 and a hostile takeover with preemption as in Propo-
sition 5, we have to consider a parameterized contest-success function. Once
again, the well-known Tullock contest described by (5) is considered. Here,
in the preemption case playerM exactly chooses x^Mh = B T since this
strategy leads to a winning probability of one while investing the minimum
amount of resources necessary for preemption. For the scenario of a friendly
takeover, we know from (12) that expected welfare amounts to
WM +
PA
PA + PB
W   PAPB
PA + PB
= WM +
PA
PA + PB
(PA   PB) : (13)
In the case of a hostile takeover with preemption, duopoly welfare is ensured
at total costs B   T so that expected welfare is given by
WD   (B   T ) =WM + PA   PB: (14)
Since in the latter case e¢ cient litigation requires WD   (B   T ) >
WM , W > B   T to hold which is identical to condition (4), com-
parison of (13) and (14) yields the following result:
Corollary 3 Let the contest-success function be described by (5). If litiga-
tion is e¢ cient under the friendly takeover, then this will also be the case
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under the hostile takeover with preemption. Moreover, in this case expected
welfare is always larger under the hostile takeover with preemption than under
the friendly takeover.
The preemption case introduces a new trade-o¤. On the one hand, one
party top management M spends a very high amount of resources. On
the other hand, the welfare reducing takeover is prevented with probability
one, and the other party spends no resources in the contest. Whereas in
general, depending on the given parameter values and the type of contest-
success function either e¤ect can dominate, in the case of a Tullock litigation
contest the positive e¤ects of preemption prevail.
The second aspect which has not been discussed so far is the scenario of
two consecutive contests under a hostile takeover. It is possible that the AA
and the top management act sequentially instead of simultaneously. That is,
in a rst stage, we have a litigation contest between the agency and the buyer.
If the agency is successful, the merger is prevented and the game ends. If,
on the other hand, the buyer is successful, there will be a takeover contest at
the second stage where the top management of the target rm spends further
resources to defend its rm against raider B.14 Note that there are parallels
between this scenario and the above mentioned case of Oracle versus People-
Soft in which a lawsuit on a poison pill follows the antitrust decision. Under
two consecutive contests, results (and conclusions to be drawn from these
results) may well be di¤erent from those presented in Section 4. Therefore,
in the following we will consider the case of two sequential contests.
Suppose that the agency has lost the litigation contest. Then, with a
similar argumentation as in the previous analysis, the parties choose their
second-stage resource expenditures in order to maximize (15) and (16), re-
14For simplicity, we use the same contest success function in both contests.
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spectively.
BM  p (xM ; xB)    xM (15)
(B   T )  (1  p (xM ; xB))  xB: (16)
Denote the equilibrium solution to these maximization problems by (xMh; x

Bh2).
This solution has similar properties as the solutions to the contests in Sec-
tions 3 and 4 since all decisions from stage 1 are sunk at this stage. We
therefore directly turn to the rst stage, where the agency maximizes
Wp(xMh; x

Bh2) + [W (1  p(xMh; xBh2))]  p (xA; xB)  xA (17)
while Bs objective function is given by
[(B   T ) (1  p(xMh; xBh2))  xBh2]  (1  p (xA; xB))  xB: (18)
Under a sequential structure, the introduction of a top management ght-
ing against a takeover a¤ects the litigation contest by reducing the expected
winner prizes conditional on winning of both the agency and the raider.15
For the agency, it becomes less problematic to lose the litigation, because
there is still a chance that the takeover is prevented by the management.
Hence, it su¤ers less from losing or, in other words, gains less from winning
the litigation contest. The raider values winning the litigation less, as he still
cannot be certain that the takeover will take place and additionally must
spend resources in a second contest.
As both parties gain less from winning the contest, it is likely that they
reduce their resource expenditures. In fact, if jp12j is not too large, this can
be formally shown.16 This means that the possibility of a second party try-
ing to prevent a takeover, M , discourages the agency as well as the buyer
15The expected winner prizes conditional on winning are W (1 p(xMh; xBh2)) for the
agency, and (B   T ) (1  p(xMh; xBh2))  xBh2 for the buyer.
16One can show that the party who initially valued winning higher always reduces its
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and leads to a welfare improvement in terms of lower expenditures spent in
the litigation contest. This welfare improvement, however, comes at the cost
of a possible second contest, in which further resources are wasted. Hence,
compared to the case where the takeover is friendly, aggregate resource ex-
penditures may become higher or lower.
As before, expected welfare also changes with the probability that the
takeover is prevented. In this context, the introduction of a top management
at the second stage of the model has two e¤ects: First, there is an extra
chance that the merger is prevented, which leads to an increase in welfare.
Second, the winning probability of the agency in the litigation contest may
be a¤ected, too. This is a consequence of the reduction in winner prizes
of both parties taking part in the rst-stage contest and the corresponding
change in the parties resource expenditures. As the raiders winner prize
decreases relatively more,17 it is likely that the agencys winning probability
increases compared to the situation of a friendly takeover. This is benecial,
because the ine¢ cient takeover is more likely to be prevented. Moreover,
it has the further advantage that a possible second contest with additional
waste of resources does not take place.
To conclude, we revisit our special example and assume the contest-
success function to be given by (5). Recall that, in this case, expected welfare
expenditures. This may make the contest more even and, hence, more intense. In this
case, the other partys change in expenditures is determined by two countervailing e¤ects.
In order to make sure that the party also invests less in the litigation contest, we have to
constrain the absolute value of the cross derivative, jp12j.
17Recall that the raiders winner prize decreases through two channels, through the
chance of being defeated in the second-period contest and through the resources he must
additionally invest.
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under a friendly takeover is
W^ = WD 

1  PB
PA + PB

+WM  PB
PA + PB
  PAPB
PA + PB
: (19)
In contrast, expected welfare under a hostile takeover with two consecutive
contests is
~W = WD 
 
1 
~PB
~PA + ~PB
PB
PM + PB
!
+WM
~PB
~PA + ~PB
PB
PM + PB
(20)
 
~PA ~PB
~PA + ~PB
 
~PB
~PA + ~PB
PMPB
PM + PB
where ~PA := W (1 p(xMh; xBh2)) = PBPM+PBPA and ~PB := (B   T ) (1 
p(xMh; x

Bh2)) xBh2 = PBPM+PBPB 
PMP
2
B
(PM+PB)
2 . Comparing W^ and ~W , we can
derive the following result:
Corollary 4 Let the contest success function be given by (5) and suppose
that 2PM < PB + 7PA. Then, there exists a cut-o¤ value Z^ such that W^ is
higher than ~W , if and only if B   T > Z^.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 4 states that under a relatively weak condition on PM , we have
~W > W^ unless B   T becomes too large. If B   T gets large, the
merger is likely to take place in either scenario, as the buyer invests heavily
to a¤ect the contest outcomes. The di¤erence between the scenarios is that
the buyer needs to succeed in two contests under the sequential structure,
but in only one in the case of a friendly takeover. Therefore, more resources
are wasted in the former case and welfare is higher in the latter. Finally, note
that 2PM < PB + 7PA is a su¢ cient condition, which is usually excessively
strong.
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6 Conclusion
This paper wants to highlight the potential perils of the U.S. antitrust system
which focuses on a formal litigation contest between the buyer and the AA.
The results show that this contest may be so expensive that the gross wel-
fare gains from prohibiting a merger might be completely o¤set by the huge
amounts of litigation expenditures. The lawsuit of the DOJ against Oracle
trying to take over PeopleSoft as sketched in the introduction indicates that
this problem is indeed relevant in practice.
Note that we do not compare the antitrust enforcement in the U.S. with
that in the E.U.. In the given setting, where the agency knows for sure that
merging only serves to obtain market control and reduces welfare, such com-
parison would be rather unfair and trivial: the U.S. or adversarial systemwith
positive litigation costs and a success probability strictly smaller than one
is always dominated by the E.U. or inquisitorial system. A serious compari-
son has to include further aspects such as the opportunity costs of time and
the quality of the antitrust decision, for example. Whereas the opportunity
costs of time should be considerably high under the U.S. system due to the
time consuming litigation process, the quality of the antitrust decision might
be better under the U.S. than under the E.U. system since the adversarial
system consults further experts and their valuable knowledge. However, the
litigation might be used by either party the raider and the management of
the target rm in case of a hostile takeover rather for inuence activities
than for searching for an e¢ cient decision.
Future research should combine the litigation problem with the litera-
ture on corporate governance. Typically, the public corporation consists of
di¤erent parties with heterogeneous interests. In particular, we have to dif-
ferentiate between the owners or shareholders of the corporation and its top
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management. There exist several situations in which the interests of these
two parties fall apart, including the threat of a hostile takeover given an
ine¢ cient top management. The litigation contest should then be discussed
together with questions regarding management compensation. For example,
it might be rational for the shareholders of the target rm to give golden para-
chutes to its top management in order to prevent the waste of rm resources
within the litigation contest. Another possibility would be to combine the
litigation process with the aspect of strategic delegation to managers. As
we know from the literature on strategic delegation (e.g. Fershtman and
Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987), compensation of managers can be used to make
them behave more or less aggressively in the market compared to a situation
without strategic delegation. Since strategic management compensation in-
uences rm prots and welfare, it will also have an impact on the strategic
interaction during the litigation contest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
It is easy to see that the optimality conditions are given by
Wp1 (x

Ah + x

Mh; x

Bh)  1  0 (= 0 if xAh > 0) (A1)
BM

p1 (x

Ah + x

Mh; x

Bh)  1  0 (= 0 if xMh > 0) (A2)
  (B   T ) p2 (xAh + xMh; xBh)  1  0 (= 0 if xBh > 0): (A3)
(i) Let W > BM

. Then the left-hand side (LHS) of (A2) is always smaller
than the LHS of (A1). Hence, it must be thatWp1 (xAh + x

Mh; x

Bh) 1 = 0
and BM

p1 (x

Ah + x

Mh; x

Bh)  1 < 0 so that xAh > 0 and xMh = 0. It follows
that we obtain exactly the same results as in Section 3.
(ii) Now consider W < BM

which (in analogy to case (i)) implies that
the LHS of (A2) is zero and the LHS of (A1) is negative with xMh > 0
and xAh = 0. The characterization of the equilibrium is completed by
  (B   T ) p2(xMh; xBh) = 1, i.e. the binding version of (A3).
(iii) W = BM

yields a continuum of equilibria in which A and M may
both choose an interior solution so that xAh+x

Mh makes (A1) (and (A2)) hold
with equality. ForB, the optimality condition is given by  (B   T ) p2(xAh+
xMh; x

Bh) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Di¤erentiating (10) and (11) with respect to Py yields (for simplicity we write
y instead of y(Py; Pz) and z instead of z(Py; Pz))
p1 (y
; z) + Py

p11 (y
; z))
@y
@Py
+ p12 (y
; z)
@z
@Py

= 0 (A4)
 Pz

p21 (y
; z)
@y
@Py
+ p22 (y
; z)
@z
@Py

= 0: (A5)
Note that p21 (y; z) = p12 (y; z). Simultaneous solution of (A4) and (A5)
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leads to
@y
@Py
=   p22 (y
; z) p1 (y; z)
Py

p11 (y; z) p22 (y; z)  (p12 (y; z))2
 (A6)
@z
@Py
=
p1 (y
; z) p12 (y; z)
Py

p11 (y; z) p22 (y; z)  (p12 (y; z))2
 (A7)
with p11 (y; z) p22 (y; z)  (p12 (y; z))2 < 0. Hence, @y@Py is always positive
which directly proves part (a) of the proposition (i.e. xMh > x

A) as W <
BM

.
(b) Notice that xBh   xB =
R BM

W
@z(t;PB)
@Py
dt. Further note, given the
symmetry of the contest success function p (; ), that the player with the
higher winner prize always spends more resources in equilibrium. Hence,
since PB = B   T  W = PA < BM we have xA  xB and xMh > xBh.
According to (A7), @z

@Py
is negative if and only if p12 (y; z) > 0 or  by
Assumption 1(iii) y > z. Therefore @z
(t;PB)
@Py
jt=W  0 due to xA  xB.
Moreover, @z
(t;PB)
@Py
is never positive and strictly negative for t = BM

. It
follows that xBh   xB =
R BM

W
@z(t;PB)
@Py
dt < 0, xBh < xB.
In case (c), we have B   T  BM > W and, accordingly, xA < xB
and xMh  xBh. From (A7) we know that @z

@Py
is positive if and only if
p12 (y
; z) < 0 or y < z. Therefore, @z
(t;PB)
@Py
is never negative and strictly
positive for t = W , which implies that xBh   xB =
R BM

W
@z(t;PB)
@Py
dt > 0,
xBh > x

B.
Finally, in case (d), we have W < B   T < BM . Then, we can
rewrite
xBh   xB =
Z B T
W
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt+
Z BM

B T
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt: (A8)
The rst term on the RHS of (A8) is strictly positive, the second term strictly
negative. Moreover, the second term is strictly decreasing in BM

. If BM

!
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B   T ,
R BM

B T
@z(t;Pz)
@Py
dt! 0 and xBh > xB. Furthermore, ifZ B T
W
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt+
Z +1
B T
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt > 0
it must always be that xBh > x

B. However, ifZ B T
W
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt+
Z +1
B T
@z(t; PB)
@Py
dt < 0
there must be some cut-o¤ ~Z, with B   T < ~Z < 1, where the sign of
xBh   xB changes.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The probability that the takeover can be prevented is given by
p(y(Py; Pz); z(Py; Pz)) (A9)
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to Py yields
dp
dPy
= p1(y
(Py; Pz); z(Py; Pz))  @y

@Py
(A10)
+p2(y
(Py; Pz); z(Py; Pz))  @z

@Py
:
From the optimality conditions (10) and (11) we know that p1(y(Py; Pz);
z(Py; Pz)) = 1Py and p2(y
(Py; Pz); z(Py; Pz)) =   1Pz . Further, (A5) states
that @z

@Py
=  p21(y
;z) @y

@Py
p22(y;z)
. Inserting these three conditions into (A10), we can
rewrite dp
dPy
> 0 as
1
Py
 @y

@Py
+
1
Pz

p21 (y
; z) @y

@Py
p22 (y; z)
> 0, Pz >  p21 (y
; z)
p22 (y; z)
 Py: (A11)
Hence, if Pz >  p21(y;z)p22(y;z) Py, we will have that
dp
dPy
is always strictly positive.
As W < BM

, this implies that p (xMh; x

Bh) > p (x

A; x

B) with Pz = PB and
Py 2
 
W; BM


.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
In the optimum, we must have that
Wp1 (x^

Ah + x^

Mh; x^

Bh)  1  0 (A12)
BM

p1 (x^

Ah + x^

Mh; x^

Bh)  1  0 (A13)
  (B   T   xM) p2 (x^Ah + x^Mh; x^Bh)  1  0: (A14)
Case (i) is identical with Proposition 2(i).
(ii) W < BM

implies that the LHS of (A13) is zero and the LHS of
(A12) is negative with x^Mh > 0 and x^

Ah = 0. In case of x^

Mh < B   T ,
the LHS of (A14) is zero so that x^Mh; x^

Bh > 0 are described by (A13) and
(A14) which must hold with equality. In case of x^Mh  B T , the LHS of
(A14) is negative which implies a corner solution for player B, too: x^Bh = 0.
We have x^Mh > 0 being characterized by (A13) which holds with equality
with x^Ah = x^

Bh = 0.
(iii) W = BM

leads to a continuum of equilibria with x^Ah+ x^

Mh making
(A12) (or (A13)) hold with equality. ForB, we have either an interior solution
(if x^Mh < B   T ) or a corner solution (if x^Mh  B   T ).
Proof of Corollary 4:
Note that
~PB
~PA + ~PB
=
P 2B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
:
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From (19) and (20) we then see that W^ > ~W is equivalent to
WD 

1  PB
PA + PB

+WM
PB
PA + PB
  PAPB
PA + PB
>
WD 

1  P
2
B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
PB
PM + PB

+WM
P 2B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
PB
PM + PB
  PAP
3
B
(PM + PB)P 2B + (PM + PB)
2 PA
  P
2
B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
PMPB
PM + PB
:
This condition can be simplied to
 
WD  WM   P 2B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
PB
PM + PB
  PB
PA + PB

  PAPB
PA + PB
+
PAP
3
B
(PM + PB)P 2B + (PM + PB)
2 PA
+
P 2B
P 2B + (PM + PB)PA
PMPB
PM + PB
> 0;
which can be further transformed into
(WD  WM)  ((PA + PB)P 2B   (PM + PB)P 2B   (PM + PB)2 PA)
 PA
 
(PM + PB)P
2
B + (PM + PB)
2 PA

+ (PA + PM)P
2
B (PA + PB) > 0
, (WD  WM)  ( P 2B   PAPM   2PBPA)
 2P 2APB   PMP 2A + P 3B > 0:
Finally, noting that PA = WD  WM , one can rewrite the condition as
Y :=  PAP 2B   2P 2APM   4PBP 2A + P 3B > 0:
Recall that PA = CSD CSM (B T ) and PB = B T . It directly
follows that, for B   T = 0, Y < 0 and, accordingly, W^ < ~W . On the
other hand, if B   T ! CSD   CSM , it is easy to see that PA ! 0 and
so Y > 0. Further, it is straightforward to show that @PA
@(B T ) =  1 and
@PB
@(B T ) = 1. Hence, we have
@Y
@(B   T ) = P
2
B   2PAPB + 4PAPM   4P 2A + 8PAPB + 3P 2B
= 4P 2B + 4PAPM   4P 2A + 6PAPB
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and
@Y 2
@2(B   T ) = 8PB   4PM + 8PA   6PB + 6PA = 2PB   4PM + 14PA:
If 2PM < PB+7PA, we see that @Y
2
@2(B T ) > 0. This implies that
@Y
@(B T )
is either always positive, or negative for small values ofB T and positive
for larger values of B   T . Thus, there must be a unique value for
B   T , denoted as Z^, where Y becomes positive. This completes the
proof of Corollary 4.
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